Deepening and Enlarging the EU: The Devil Lies in the Details… and in the Timing

Skopje, November 3, 2025

Pre-Enlargement reforms urgently needed to absorb new member states

I have been following the process from within the Enlargement framework, more  specifically its institutional evolution, over the past three decades. I have witnessed successes and failures, from a “Nobel Prize winner” to moments when it seemed “lost in its own labyrinth.”

The peak of the enlargement process was reached in 2004 (the “Big Bang” wave) and 2007 (Romania and Bulgaria), concluding in 2013 with Croatia as the last country to join the Union. While there were attempts to proceed with the Enlargement or Unification process, they seem not to have been genuine enough to finalize a project that started right after WWII.

Now, we are in a different time, with changed circumstances and diverse global challenges, but the goal remains the same: to finally complete the complex process of unifying the entire territory of the European Union, something that should have been done a long time ago. Considering how rapidly the global environment is changing, we have no time to look backward; we must look forward with wide open eyes and clear minds. History is written by winners and built by leaders with vision and charisma.

Focusing on Internal Reforms

We must return to reality and focus on the reforms needed for the Union to move forward, and faster.

The September 2023 Franco-German report on EU reform, titled “Sailing on High Seas,” prepared by a group of independent experts, suggested institutional changes that could be made without treaty changes and set a 2030 target for enlargement readiness. As a follow-up, the Commission adopted a Communication on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews in March 2024, which needs to be reviewed by the European Parliament and the Council.

The document outlines the internal reforms the EU will need to make to prepare for an enlarged Union, implying the EU must deepen as it widens. The Union must start preparing today for the Union of tomorrow and use enlargement as a catalyst for progress.

The European Parliament adopted the Resolution of 22 October 2025 on the institutional consequences of the EU enlargement negotiations (2025/2041(INI)), which firmly establishes the EP’s demand for deep internal reform to ensure the EU can successfully enlarge. The subsequent debate focused on interventions from the Rapporteur, Mr. Sandro Gozi (Renew Group), and Mrs. Marta Kos (Enlargement Commissioner).

Mr. Gozi’s key point was the urgency of deep reform: He insisted that the EU must overcome the “paralysis of unanimity” to secure a faster, stronger, and more democratic Union, proposing an aggressive extension of QMV. He explicitly called for the extension of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to key policy areas, including sanctions and the opening and closing of accession clusters.

Mrs. Kos’s key point was the strategic imperative: She labelled enlargement as a geostrategic necessity, confirming that internal reforms must advance in parallel with the accession process to ensure credibility. She also highlighted the need for a pragmatic approach: She signalled that the Commission would focus on “what can already be done under the current Treaties” where consensus is already possible, potentially using existing “passerelle clauses” to move away from unanimity in limited areas.

The European Parliament’s Vision (2025/2041(INI))

The EP’s Resolution provides the most far-reaching vision for institutional change, setting a high bar for internal EU reform before the next wave of accessions:

  • Decision-Making: Demands the widespread application of QMVto prevent a single Member State from blocking crucial decisions, especially on foreign policy, sanctions, the MFF (budget), and, critically, the accession process itself (e.g., greenlighting negotiation clusters).
  • Resources and Policy: Calls for a reform of the EU budget(MFF) to ensure the financial capacity to support both current members and new entrants, as well as reforms in sectoral policies (e.g., energy, defence).
  • Differentiated Integration: Supports a “Europe of free political will”where sub-groups of willing Member States can push ahead with deeper integration (e.g., defence cooperation) without waiting for unanimous consent from all members.
    • The concept of differentiation is back.EU differentiation (or differentiated integration) is a core characteristic of the European Union where not all member states participate in all EU policies to the same extent. This mechanism allows groups of countries to integrate further in specific areas without being blocked by others who are unwilling or unable to join at the same time or in the same way, thereby preventing political deadlock and facilitating both deepening and widening of the EU.

The Announced and Expected Commission Communication for November 4 (postponed for after 19 November), 2025

During the European Parliament debate, Commissioner Kos officially announced that the European Commission will present a special Communication on pre-enlargement policy reviews and reforms on November 4, 2025 (postponed for after 19 November), concurrently with the annual 2025 Enlargement Package.

Basically, on November 4, the Commission will publish:

  • The Enlargement Package 2025, consisting of a Strategic Communication and Country Reports: This will assess candidate countries’ progress (including North Macedonia) against the Copenhagen Criteria and set policy recommendations for the year ahead.
  • Special Communication on Pre-enlargement Reforms (a non-binding Communication or “Soft Law”), outlining the Commission’s roadmap for internal EU reform, focusing on how to make the Union “fit for enlargement” in areas like values, policies, budget, and governance (postponed for after 19 November).

This Communication is a non-binding strategic document that will seek to establish a common direction among the 27 Member States, focusing on achievable reforms without requiring immediate, contentious Treaty changes. This aligns with Commissioner Kos’s pragmatic goal of utilizing existing legal mechanisms where possible to advance QMV in limited areas.

Potential Consequences for North Macedonia

The two documents, the EP Resolution and the EC Special Communication on institutional pre-enlargement reforms, reflect a growing consensus that the EU itself must change. This may have direct consequences for North Macedonia, specifically in challenging the veto mechanism, increasing the credibility of the process, and putting additional pressure on Member States (in the Council decisions).

In short, both the Resolution and the upcoming Communication signal that the EU acknowledges its own institutional failings are contributing to the stall in North Macedonia’s accession and are now actively proposing solutions to fix the “veto problem”.

However, the rule “the devil lies in the details” remains, considering the complex, two-tiered decision-making process: first, Unanimity and QMV (QMV if agreed for interim steps in the accession negotiations), and second, Reversed QMV (RQMV), that can be used for corrective measures or the suspension of negotiations, triggered by the Commission or just one Member State.

Picture of Dragan Tilev

Dragan Tilev

Former State Counsellor for EU Affairs, North Macedonia